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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO 
ALAN J. DAVIS, - SPECIAL, 
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE 
OF SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
STATE OF OHIO, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 96-312322-CV 
JUDGE SUTULA 
MOTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO TO 
DISMISS 
Defendant, by and through counsel, Stephanie Tubbs Jones, 
Prosecuting Attorney for Cuyahoga County, and Assistant Prosecuting 
Attorneys, Marilyn Barkley Cassidy and Patrick J. Murphy, hereby 
moves this honorable court to dismiss the within action pursuant to 
Ohio Civil Rule 12(B) (6). The grounds for this motion are that the 
Petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as 
is set forth more fully in the brief attached hereto and expressly 
incorporat~d herein by reference. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, Prosecuting 
Attorney of Cuyahoga County, Ohio 
Bar ley Cassidy (O 
Patrick . Murphy (0002401) 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorne 
1200 Ontario Street - 8th Flo r 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-7785 
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF OHIO 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
INTRODUCTION 
Alan u·. Davis, Special Administrator of the Estate of Samuel 
Sheppard, through counsel, has requested the Cuyahoga County Court 
of Common Pleas, by way of petition, to make a determination that 
he is a wrongfully incarcerated individual pursuant to R. C. 
§2305.02 and §2743.48. The State of Ohio asserts that, pursuant to 
Ohio Civil Rule 12 (B) (6) the court should dismiss the action. 
The State of Ohio is entitled to dismissal by operation of the 
doctrine of laches and the applicable statutes of limitation. 
Additionally, a claim of wrongful incarceration is a personal claim 
which an estate has no standing to pursue. Finally, any claim 
which may have been lawfully asserted by Samuel Sheppard has abated 
with his death, the passage of time, and his failure to pursue the 
claim at or near the time of his acquittal. 
FACTS 
Dr. Samuel Sheppard was indicted for murder in the first 
degree on August 17, 1954, in connection with the death of his 
wife, Marilyn Sheppard. (Complaint Paragraph 1) His trial ended 
with a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree on December 
21, 1954, and on January 3, 1955 he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. (Complaint, paragraph 2). After a lengthy appeals 
process, the United States Supreme Court in 1964, reversed the 
conviction and ordered a new trial based on the unfairness of the 
trial and the prejudicial role of the media. (Complaint, paragraph 
2 
3). On November 16, 1966, Dr. Sheppard was subject to a re-trial 
and found not g'..l.ilty of the murder. (Complaint paragraph 4). Dr. 
Sheppard was incarcerated for nearly ten years in Ohio prisons. 
(Complaint, paragraph 5). 
Dr. Sheppard died on April 6, 1970. (Complaint, paragraph 6). 
The action at bar was filed by the Special Administrator to the 
Estate of Samuel Sheppard in October, 1995, nearly thirty years 
after Dr. Sheppard's acquittal. 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
A. A MOTION TO DISMISS IS BOTH PROPER AND PERMISSIBLE WHERE 
THE PLAINTIFF CAN PROVE NO SET OF FACTS ENTITLING HIM TO 
RECOVERY 
"Under a Civil Rule 12 (B) ( 6) motion, the court must, as a 
matter of law, accept all the allegations in the complaint as true. 
To grant such a motion, it must appear beyond doubt from the 
complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling 
him to recovery. " Greely v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs. , 
Inc., (1990) 49 Ohio St. 3d 228. See also O'Brien v. University 
Community Tenants Union, (1975) 42 Ohio St. 2d 242 ; (Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 followed). 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff can prove no set of facts 
entitling him to judgment. As is set forth more fully in the 
following sections: 
1. Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action; 
2. The action is barred by the doctrine of laches; 
3. The action is barred by the statute of limitations; 
4. The action, if any, abated with the death of Samuel 
Sheppard. 
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For all of the foregoing reasons, the complaint fails to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted and the action should be 
dismissed. 
B. THIS ACTION FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION IS BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF LACHES 
In order to successfully prosecute a claim of laches, the 
person asserting the claim must show that he has been materially 
prejudiced by the delay of the adverse party in asserting his 
rights." Smith v. Smith, 169 Ohio St. 447, 455, 156, N.E. 2d 113, 
119 (1959) The elements of laches are: delay or lapse of time in 
asserting a right, absence of excuse for such delay, knowledge, 
actual or constructive, of injury or wrong, and prejudice to the 
other party. Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, (1984) 16 Ohio App 3d 
399, 476 N.E. 2d 683. Delay in asserting a right does not of 
itself constitute laches and in order to successfully invoke the 
equitable doctrine of laches, it must be shown that the person for 
whose bencf it the doctrine will operate has been materially 
prejudiced by the delay of person asserting his claim. Thirty Four 
Corp. v'. Sixty Seven Corp, (1984) 15 Ohio St. 3d 350, 474 N.E. 2d. 
299. Laches is an omission to assert a right for an unreasonable 
and unexplained length of time under circumstances prejudicial to 
the adverse party; it signifies delay independent of limitations 
in statutes, and it is lodged principally in equity jurisprudence. 
Cunnin v. Bailey (1984) 15 Ohio St. 3d. 34, 472 N.E.2d. 328. 
4 
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It is readily ascertainable from the face of the pleadings in 
the case at bar, that an overwhelmingly prejudicial lapse in time 
has occurr~d between the acquittal of Samuel Sheppard and the 
filing of this claim. In the intervening thirty years since the 
acquittal and the near forty two years since the crime occurred, 
events have transpired which preclude the State of Ohio from 
presenting its complete case; not the least of which is the death 
of the individual alleged to have been wrongfully incarcerated. 
(Petition, paragraph 6). Claimant's representatives conducted 
witness interviews between the years 1990 and 1995; nearly thirty 
years after the crime, when memories have undeniably faded. 
Moreover, prior to the enactment of R.C. §2743.48 and R.C. 
§2305.02 recourse for wrongful incarceration existed in the form of 
moral claims. Since as early as 1923, consideration was given to 
a fault in the justice system which allowed an innocent individual 
to fall through its grips and land in a correctional institution. 
"Wrongful Incarceration In Ohio: Should There be More than A Moral 
Obligation to Compensate? 12 Cap Univ. Law Rev 230. "Inherently 
defective convictions are usually initiated by witnesses/testimony 
and the circumstantial evidence admitted during trial. . .. :the 
1923 court was accurate in its analysis of such occurrences as not 
being attributable to any fault in the law; actually, the 
convictions are due to a mixture of human perceptive errors, not 
legal ones. These errors are consequences of variables such as a 
witness or victim's reactions to the crime, the level of 
disturbance in the emotional balance of an individual in response 
5 
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to both physical and mental stress. 
Generally, the faulty convictions were not acknowledged until 
the true guilty party was ascertained. Thereupon, the legislature 
may feel a moral obligation to rectify state infliction of injury 
upon an individual. Certain requirements must be met before the 
legislaturP. so acted: 
"First, a cause of action against the state 
must not exist for the individual in a court 
of law Second there must be a moral 
obligation to make amends. A moral obligation 
is one which is not enforceable by action, 
but is binding on the party who has the 
obligation in conscience and according to 
natural justice. The obligation is viewed as a 
duty which would be enforceable if not for a 
rule, such as sovereign immunity, which 
exempts the party from legal liability. The 
extent to which moral obligations are to be 
recognized has been deemed to be a 
determination properly remaining in the hands 
of the legislature. Finally, there must be no 
dispute as to the facts of the particular 
c:ase". 
"Wrongful Incarceration in Ohio': Should there Be More Than A Moral 
Obligation to Compensate?" 12 Capital University Law Review 265 
(1982). 
Clearly Samuel Sheppard, himself, could have sought redress at 
or near the time of his acquittal through the moral claims process. 
He failed to do so. Since Sheppard's demise in 1970, only his 
estate, whose standing is questionable and will be further examined 
below, is left to initiate the claim. The petitioner has set 
forth no explanation as to why no recourse has been sought until 
now. While events which have transpired over the passage of time 
have materially prejudiced the State of Ohio, the face of the 
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pleadings reveal that Samuel Sheppard is unavailable to testify at 
his own trial. Accordingly, the State's motion should be granted'. 
C. THIS ACTION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The bulk of the Wrongful Imprisonment statute appears in 
Chapter 2743 Court of Claims. However, R.C. Section 2305.02 
provides that the court of common pleas has original jurisdiction 
over the first stage of the bifurcated proceeding. Accordingly, 
the general statutes of limitation contained in R.C. Chapter 2305 
apply to such actions. 
R.C. §2305.07 
"Except as provided in sections 126. 301 
and 1302. 98 of the Revised Code, an action 
upon a contract not in writing, express or 
implied, or upon a liability created by 
statute other than a forfeiture or penalty, 
shall be brought within six years after the 
cause thereof accrued. 11 
R.C. §2743.48 is a remedial, not a penal statute, as at least 
one court has note, Wright v. State, 69 Ohio App. 3d 775, 591 
N.E.2d 1279 (1990). 
"For purposes of statutory construction, 
'penal statute' is one which imposes penalty 
or creates forfeiture, while 'remedial 
statute' is enacted to correct past defects, 
to redress existing wrong, or to promote 
public good.. In this regard 2743. 48 is a 
remedial statute in that it addresses an 
existing wrong. The General Assembly 
determined that it was patently wrong to deny 
a person compensation when the judicial system 
failed to adequately safeguard his rights, 
under the circumstances set forth in the 
7 
statute ... It does not appear the legislature 
intended the remedy to penal ... " 
Wright v. State, supra, at 779. 
The proceeding at bar is a statutory one. Petitioner seeks to 
recover damages upon a liability created by statute. Absent the 
statute, no liability would exist on the part of the State of Ohio 
by virtue of sovereign immunity. As a matter of public policy, the 
legislature could not have intended that there exist no time limit 
upon an individual's right to seek recovery for wrongful 
incarceration. As a matter of law, the six year limitation set 
forth in R.C. §2305.07 applies. The action can be said to have 
accrued, most conservatively speaking, no later than the effective 
date of the statute, September 24, 1986. As the petition.er in this 
action did not file until October 19, 1995, the commencement of the 
action falls outside the six year limitation period of §2305.07. 
R.C. §2305.09 
"Four Years; certain torts 
An action for any of the following causes shall be brought 
within four years after the cause thereof accrued; 
(A) For trespassing upon real property; 
(B) For the recovery of personal property, or for taking or 
detaining it; 
(C) For relief on the ground of fraud; 
(D) For an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising 
on contract nor enumerated in sections §2305.10 to 
§2305.12, §2305.14 and §1304.34 of the Revised Code .. 
R. C. §2305 .10 applies to bodily injury or injury to personal 
property; §2305 .11 deals with libel, slander malicious prosecution, 
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false imprisonment and malpractice; R.C. §1304.34 applies to 
commercial transactions. Thus, any rights of the petitioner, 
herein, fall under section (D) of R.C. §2305.09. A liberal 
interpretation of accrual yields the date the wrongful 
incarceration statute became effective, September 24, 1986. Thus, 
assuming for the purpose of this motion that petitioner in fact has 
a claim, the statute of limitations ran in September of 1990, and 
this claim is barred. 
D. THE ESTATE OF SAMUEL SHEPPARD LACKS STANDING TO BRING A 
CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION 
The adoption of Ohio Constitution, Art. IV Section 4, in its 
present form in 1968 made justiciability a constitutional 
requirement, expressly adopting the view which had long been taken 
by the Ohio Supreme Court. Fortner v. Thomas (1970) 22 Ohio St. 
2d. 13 (concurring opinion of Duncan, J.). 
"It has been long and well established that.it 
is the duty of every judicial tribunal 'to 
decide actual controversies between parties 
legitimately affected by specific facts and to 
render judgments which can be carried into 
effect. It has become settled judicial 
responsibility for courts to refrain from 
giving opinions on abstract propositions and 
to avoid the imposition by judgment of 
premature declarations or advice upon 
potential controversies. " Fortner v. Thomas, 
supra, at 13. 
Even before the enactment of the constitutional requirement of 
justiciability, Ohio Courts had never permitted their jurisdiction 
to be invoked for the determination of abstract declarations or for 
the consideration of anything other than actual controversies 
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between the actual parties litigant. For example, in Stewart v. 
Southard, 17 Ohio 402 (1848), the court held: 
"It is our duty to decide such questions only 
as become necessary to ascertain the rights of 
the parties litigant, and are legitimately 
presented upon the record, and we cannot 
admit that parties have the power to call 
for an opinion on a matter not thus presented, 
which is out of the case. " Stewart, 
supra, at 406. 
The question of jus tertii standing has been examined most fully in 
federal courts. As the Supreme Court stated in Valley Forge 
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, Inc. 454 U.S. 464 (1982): 
"The term 'standing' subsumes a blend of 
constitutional requirements and prudential 
considerations [A]t an irreducible 
minimum, Art. III requires the party who 
invokes the court's authority to 'show that he 
personally has suffered some actual or 
threatened injury as a result of the 
. ' putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.'· 
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 
U.S. 91 99 (1979) , and that the injury 
'fairly can be traced to the challenged action 
and is likely to be redressed by a favorable 
decision," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare 
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976) In 
this manner does Article III limit the federal 
judicial power 'to those disputes which 
confine federal courts to a role consistent 
with a system of separated powers and which 
are traditionally thought to be capable of 
resolution through the judicial process.' 
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) 
Thus, the standing doctrine can be organized into a three-
factor test: (1) injury in fact; (2) causation; and (3) 
redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 
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3136 (1992). 
In the case at bar, factors one (injury in fact) and three 
(redressability) are not met. The individual who is alleged to 
have been wrongfully incarcerated is deceased. As is discussed 
above, there is no provision under law for an estate to seek 
recovery in a representative capacity. Moreover, as will be 
discussed in greater depth below, the statute at issue, R. C. 
§2743.48 applies only to individuals, NOT their representatives, 
heirs and assigns. Additionally, there is no allegation in the 
petition as to any injury by virtue of wrongful incarceration to 
anyone except the deceased, Samuel Sheppard. Finally, assuming 
some injury in fact did occur to Samuel Sheppard, money damages to 
the estate cannot redress those injuries. It is clear that the 
Estate of Samuel Sheppard has failed to set forth the 
constitutionally requisite case and controversy to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court. 
E. O.R.C. §2743.48 CAN BE CONSTRUED ONLY TO AFFORD REDRESS 
TO WRONGFULLY INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS, NOT THEIR HEIRS, 
REPRESENTATIVES AND ASSIGNS. 
The state has waived its immunity from liability and consented 
to be sued in the. Court of Claims by virtue of R.C. §2743.02 (A), 
which prov~des, as follows: 
"The state hereby waives its immunity from 
liability and consents to be sued, and have 
its liability determined, in the court of 
claims created in this chapter in accordance 
with the same rules of law applicable to suits 
between private parties, subject to the 
limitations set forth in this chapter." 
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The state's waiver of its sovereign immunity from liability 
has not opened up the public coffers to all who may seek recompense 
but, rather permits the liability of the state to be determined in 
accordance with the rules of law applicable to suits between 
private parties, no new claim for relief or right of action being 
created by the waiver of immunity. R.C. §2743.02 (A) merely 
permits actions against the state to be brought which were 
previously barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but such 
actions must be predicated upon previously recognized claims for 
relief, for which the state would have been liable except for 
sovereign immunity. Smith v. Wait, (1975) 46 Ohio App 2d. 281 at 
283. 
The Court of Claims Act did not authorize a new claim allowing 
a civil action against the state for wrongful imprisonment. That 
action became viable only upon the adoption of R.C. §2743.48 by the 
General Asseml?ly. 
-, 
R.C. §2743.48 created duties, rights, and 
obligations of a substantive nature. Smith v. Wait, supra. 
The scope of remediation is clearly limited to the individual by 
the statutory language. 
It is a cardinal rule that the court must first look to 
language of a statute itself to determine legislative intent. 
Courts do not have authority to ignore plain and unambiguous 
language of statute under guise of statutory interpretation, but 
must give effect to words used; in other words, courts may not 
delete words used or insert words not used. In re Collier (Athens 
1993) 85 Ohio App. 3d 232. In interpreting a statute words must be 
12 
taken in their usual, normal or customary meaning. Love v. 
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. (Athens 1993) 86 Ohio App 3d 394. 
In Ohio, the specific inclusion by the legislature of items in a 
statute implies the exclusion of others. Kirsheman v. Paulin 
(1951) 155 Ohio St. 137, 146, Theobald v. Fugman, 64 Ohio St. 473. 
See also Investors Reit One v. Jacobs (1989) 46 Ohio St. 3d 176. 
It is significant that the drafters of this legislation chose 
the word 11 individual 11 • An individual, as defined by Websters 
Dictionary is: 
11 1. a single human being, as distinguished from a group. 
2. a person. 
3. a distinct, indivisible entity; a single thing, 
being, instance or item. 11 
The use of the word individual, as opposed to the word person, 
which has undergone extensive legal interpretation, expresses a 
clear, unambiguous intent to limit compensation to an individual. 
Further evidence of the legislature's intent to limit 
·\ 
eligibility for compensation under R.C. §2743.48 can be found in 
subsection (B) (1) : 
11 When a court of common pleas determines, 
. that a person is a wrongfully imprisoned 
individual, the court shall provide the person 
with a copy of this section and orally inform 
him and his attorney of his rights under this 
section. 
(Emphasis Added) 
Such language demonstrates a clear contemplation that the 
litigant himself be present. Moreover, as a matter of public 
policy it is logical that a remedy be available to those wrongfully 
incarcerated, but that state coffers NOT be opened to the families 
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of deceased individuals who decide to pursue a claim after the 
fact. Finally, had the legislature wished to include the 
representatives, heirs and assigns of wrongfully imprisoned 
individuals as compensable under the statute, they would have 
included specific language to so indicate. It is not within the 
authority of the court to extend clear and unambiguous language to 
areas that very language was designed to exclude. 
F. AN ACTION FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION ABATED WITH THE 
DEATH OF SAMUEL SHEPPARD 
Sectionn §2311. 21 of the Ohio Revised Code provides for 
abatement by death of a party. Specifically, the section states: 
"Unless otherwise provided, no action or 
proceeding pending in any court shall abate by 
the death of either or both of the parties 
thereto, except actions for libel, slander, 
malicious prosecution, for a nuisance or 
against a judge of a county court for 
misconduct in office, which shall abate by the 
death of either party." 
Section §2305.21, Ohio Revised Code, determines those causes 
which survive and provides: 
11 [i]n addition to the causes of action which 
survive at common law, causes of action for 
mesne profits, or injuries to the person or 
property, or for deceit or fraud, also shall 
survive; and such actions may be brought 
notwithstanding the death of the person 
entitled or liable thereto." 
"In order for an action to survive under R.C. §2305.21, the 
action must be one for injuries to the person and that term means 
physical injuries." Village of Oakwood v. Makar, 11 Ohio App 3d 
14 
46, 47, (1983). At least one court has held 11 injuries to the 
person does not encompass injuries to character or reputation: 
Flynn v. Relic, 41404 (8th District. Ohio) (June 26, 1980) 
An action for wrongful imprisonment, thus, is not an action for 
physical injuries and does not survive pursuant to R.C. §2305.21. 
Accordingly, pursuant to the "unless otherwise provided "language 
in R.C. §~311.21, the action is subject to abatement. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing facts and principles of law, the 
State of Ohio respectfully requests that the court enter judgment 
on its behalf. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY FOR CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO 
ri yn ~ kley Cassidy ( 014647) 
Patrick lMurphy (0002401) 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys 
1200 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-7785 
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